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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

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[redacted] 25X1

Copy
5 January 1979

ALERT MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Security Council

SUBJECT : China-Vietnam

Attached for your information is an alert memorandum on China-Vietnam.

STANSFIELD TURNER

25X1 Attachment: [redacted]

NI IAM 79-10001

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

[redacted] 25X1

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5 January 1979

ALERT MEMORANDUM

CHINA-VIETNAM 25X1

[redacted]

Beijing's inability to forestall the Vietnamese invasion amounts to a major setback to Chinese prestige and security interests. The Chinese likely feel compelled to demonstrate in some tangible way their determination to resist any further expansion of Vietnamese "hegemony" and shore up China's credibility as an Asian power. To this end the Chinese are preparing to support resistance forces based in the western half of Kampuchea and hope to embroil Vietnam in a costly and protracted military involvement in Kampuchea. [redacted] 25X1 25X1

[redacted]

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25X1 [redacted]

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In considering their next move, the Chinese must weigh the political and economic costs of a protracted military conflict with Vietnam. The Chinese may choose to engineer a strong localized demonstration of Chinese power along the frontier--perhaps the temporary occupation of disputed territory as they did in India in 1962. But we cannot rule out more forceful action such as Chinese airstrikes deeper into the country. Nor can we rule out miscalculation that could lead to a level of conflict both sides would prefer to avoid. [redacted] 25X1

If the Chinese escalate the level of hostilities, we would expect Moscow to respond first by conspicuously stepping up its military aid to Vietnam, by making a naval show of force off the coast of Vietnam, perhaps even a port visit, and by holding high-level consultations under Article Six of the recently concluded Friendship Treaty. If none of the above appeared to be deterring the Chinese, the Soviets might then begin a campaign of intimidation along the Sino-Soviet border--including demonstrative military air and ground patrolling, military maneuvers and ultimately, some sort of limited military provocation. [redacted] 25X1

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